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Russia on the Threshold: Orthodox Tradition and Protestant Ethics 
By Leons G. Taivans 
Leons Gabriel Taivans, a frequent contributor to REE,  is Professor of 
Religious Studies and Church History at the University of Latvia, Riga, 
Latvia 
 
 Long before autocratic Mr. Putin started his career as the President of Russia, 
many publications have advanced the old thesis that the deepest roots of Russian 
autocracy are to be found in the Russian Orthodox religion. Grigory Benevich from The 
School of Religion and Philosophy, St. Petersburg, Russia, argued: 
Speaking of today's Russia, one can say that Western ideology is not 
successful in this country. I believe that the reason for this lies not so 
much in the force of the old communist ideology as in unwillingness of 
the majority of population to accept any ideology /.../ It is dangerous 
insofar as Russia, while rejecting Western ideology, does not assimilate 
the values of an open society either — and these values presuppose, 
among other things the defence of the weak and handicapped, the defence 
of minorities. Neither does the Patriarchate speak out resolutely and 
persistently in defence of the values of an open society. Sometimes it even 
rejects them."1  
Andrey Desnitsky, a research fellow of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, argues 
that  
"Non-acceptance of the idea of social service of the Church, the attempt to 
suppress the activities of the foreign missionaries, violating the monopoly 
of the Orthodox Church in spite of its own passivity in the mission field 
among national minorities, is the consequence of the corresponding public 
opinion in a large segment of society. /.../ Contemporary political system 
for many is accepted as a stage from communism to monarchy. Some time 
ago I happened to see a slogan in a street: "Yeltsin is a way to monarchy"2. 
Recent canonisation of the last Russian tzar Nicholas II, a weak “ruler”, is a scandal 
because of his close links with the religious and political adventurer from Siberia, 
Grishka Rasputin, and is not easily explained using religious arguments. This 
canonisation was for a long time  promoted by Russian Church hard-liners, such as the 
                                                 
 1Benevitch G., “Judaism and the Future of Orthodoxy,” REE, XVIII,  2 (April 1998) : 32. 
 2Desnitsky A. “Svyaschenstvo i tsarstvo v rossiyskom obschestvennom soznanii (iz istorii odnogo 
arkhetipa)” [Sacerdotium and Monarchy in the Russian Public Opinion: History of the Archetype]. 
Continent, No.  2 (104) April-June 2000, Paris-Moscow : 227 
influential priest Valentin Asmus.3
 Authors who discuss Russian political and social conduct in its relationship to 
religion some 40 years ago, based their findings mainly on consideration of ancient 
stereotypes of Russian religious mind. They pointed especially to the Messianic ideas that 
circulated so freely in Russia, especially among Old Believers and the various Orthodox 
sects during 18th-19th centuries. These ideas, they maintained, prepared the masses 
psychologically for the total overthrow of the existing order in 1917 and for radical, 
Communist reshaping of political and social conditions.4  
 The collapse of communism raised a hope that Marxism had eliminated forever 
Orthodox stereotypes of Russian mind in favour of democracy. At the end of the last 
decade of the 20th century it turned out that the situation in Russia was not so simple and 
the renascence of Orthodox faith revitalised the age old discussion about the question 
whether Russia belongs to a European type of society or whether it is much closer to a 
Turkish type of political culture as Leibniz in 18th century Germany and Russian 
political theorist Leontiev in 19th century Russia thought.5  
 A very important argument in this respect is the fact that totalitarian ideas and 
attempts to implement them in the West (Italy, Germany, etc.) faded away after a decade 
or so, but Russia practised political terror under the communist regime for 70 years and 
today the new menace of autocratic rule seems to appear. Under the pressure of current 
political problems, there is a tendency to look at Russia and list all the ways in which her 
intellectual, political and social structures are at variance with those of Europe. In short, 
Russia is consigned to "Asia". Scholars also point to the special ecclesiastical 
development in Russia, her choice of the Byzantine form of Christianity, as specific 
                                                 
 3V. Asmus' noteworthy publication with the apology of the restoration of monarchy in Russia 
"Regnum Aeternum" (Moscow: Nash Dom—Paris: L'Age d'Homme, 1996) aroused harsh criticism in 
different scholarly and political journals (Cf. Desnicky A., “Svyaschenstvo…”: 267 ff.). 
 4Benz E. The Eastern Orthodox Church. Its Thought and Life. (New York: Doubleday, 1963): 
157—61. 
 5In a youthful essay written in 1669 Leibniz treated the Grand Duke of Moscow from the Polish 
and Roman Catholic point of view as the "Turk of the North". Later on, in the memorial on European 
politics which he wrote in 1670, entitled Considerations on the Security of the German Empire, he viewed 
the Grand Duchy of Moscow as "a possible future ally" of the European powers for their common 
defensive struggle against the Turks and Tartars. 
example of her "Asiatic" character.  
 While in the contemporary discussion between new generation of "Slavophiles" 
and "Westerners"6 the former use structural analysis, the latter rely on quantitative 
analysis, based on sociological research. The results of the research of both contradicts 
each other. 
 
The Analysis, using "Slavophiles" methodology 
 Let us try to analyse one of contemporary Western society's fundamental issues  -  
individual freedom, rooted in Martin Luther's well known thesis: "A Christian is a 
perfectly free lord  of all, subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, 
subject to all"7. Contemporary Western insight, close to the feeling of post-communist 
Protestant communities is expressed by Leslie Newbigin: 
There is no room for a piety that seeks personal holiness by opting out of 
the struggle for a measure of justice and freedom in public life. This faith 
enables us to be politically realistic without cynicism, to be sensitive to the 
supreme rule of love without sentimentality. It enables us humbly to 
acknowledge that even the best social order is - in God's sight - an 
organisation of sinful men and women and therefore always prone to 
corruption.8
According to Moltmann, human dignity is based in God's redeeming history with the 
world. Human rights reflect what God is doing and requiring to meet basic human needs, 
to free human beings from idolatry, and to bring human beings into communal 
                                                 
 6Theories of an deep gulf existing between Russia and Europe are represented by the historical 
views and cultural philosophy of the Slavophiles — Ivan Kireevsky, Constantine and Ivan Aksakov and 
Yury Samarin. These authors of early 19th century stressed the contrasts between Russia and the West, 
these contrasts being attributed to the Orthodox character of Russia. They claimed that Russia is the carrier 
of Orthodox "truth", and argued that the inner degeneracy of the West is due to Roman Catholicism and it 
offspring - Reformation. 
 Their opponents "Westerners" underlined the Russia's belonging to the Europe. They stressed that 
even the ideology of the Slavophiles was rooted most strongly in German romanticism and in German 
idealistic philosophy, chiefly the philosophies of Hegel, Schelling and Franz von Baader. "Westerners" 
argued that it can be traced further back to the ideas of Herder. In this interpretation Slavophile theory 
moved completely within a European framework. 
 7M. Luther. “The Freedom of a Christian”. Martin Luther`s Basic Theological Writings. Ed. 
Timothy F. Lull. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989): 596. 
 8Newbigin L.  Foolishness to the Greeks. The Gospel and Western Culture. Geneva: WCC, 1986: 
137. 
relationships, including relationships to past and future generations. This conception of 
human dignity and human rights provides the framework for the political theology of the 
contemporary Christian West as a whole. Responsibility of the free man and woman 
towards society is the main task of social preaching of the Church. But the concrete 
individual is free to act according to his private faith and feeling of justice. He himself is 
the ultimate authority when taking decision in the public affairs. 
 In the concept of the Orthodox Church - quite opposite - a person has no absolute 
freedom, because freedom exists only in God as an absolute harmony. Therefore man's 
freedom means harmony of his will with the will of God. "I will get freedom in God 
when my will becomes one with that of God's", explains the volume "Pastoral Theology" 
of the official "Handbook for the Priests."9  The way to this ultimate goal is obedience. 
Well known Russian theologian and sociologist Serge Bulgakov declares that a man is a 
living antinomy, conflicting duality, contradiction incarnate. This antinomy man finds in 
the depths of his heart, as an expression of his genuine substance. Man is in the image of 
God, he has the formal nature of God, he is God in potentia and this potentia opens the 
way to theosis.10 There are some Russian religious philosophers, namely Vladimir 
Solovyov, who declare the absolute freedom of a man — both in God or outside Him,11  
but this is not accepted in conventional Orthodoxy. 
 Orthodox anthropology declares man to be a mixture of Nature and Personality. 
Personality is free from the Nature and doesn't depend on it. The main principle of 
asceticism is to deny one's own will, which is an illusion of one's individual freedom and 
thus attain ultimate freedom — freedom of Personality, which is the image of God12. 
 In order to be in the image of God man must follow the example of Jesus Christ. 
Logos is always in full harmony with the Father. The work of Christ would be impossible 
                                                 
 9“Pastirskoye Bogosloviye” [Pastoral Theology]. Nastol'naya knyga svyaschennosluzhitelya 
[Handbook for the Priests], vol. 8, (Moscow: Edition of Moscow Patriarchate, 1988): 203-204. 
 10Ibid:200. 
 11 Solovyov V. S. Opravdaniye dobra. Nravstvennaya filosofiya [Justification of Goodness. 
Ethical Philosophy]. In Sochineniya, vol. 1. (Moscow, 1990: Misl'): 715. 
 12 [Handbook for the Priests], vol. 8: 201-202. 
without self-denial and sacrifice of the both natures in Christ, both of His two wills. The 
spiritual model of salvation is the denial of Jesus' will and surrendering it to the will of 
the Father, when at Gethsemane. The greatest lie of the existing world is the separation 
from the Creator, the disposition to live according to one's own will. It means the misuse 
of the gift of freedom and practice of atheism.13  
 These are not quotations from early Church Fathers, but from the newly published 
Handbook for the Orthodox ministry. Bishop Ignatius Bryanchaninov (1807-1867), 
canonised 12 years ago, and one of the most frequently quoted religious authors in 
contemporary Russia, wrote: “Jesus Christ was a perfect servant of God, who never failed 
to fulfil the will of God, who always was obedient to His father. Nobody else managed to 
fulfil this most holy of man's duties towards God in a proper way”.14  The resistance to 
God's prescribed fate is Satan's work.15  Your task, oh, people, is to fulfil God's will. The 
pattern of this work is given to us by the perfect Man; God who became man. With the 
faith in God, follow the Laws of the Kingdom and surrender in the fear of the Lord to the 
fate, prescribed by God!16  The poor! You must know that you are suffering according to 
God's will. Without the knowledge of God nothing would happen to you /.../ He has 
given sufferings to you in order to purify you, as means for you to become perfect. 
"Wherefore let them, that suffer according to the will of God, commit the keeping of their 
souls to Him in well doing as unto a faithful Creator" (I Pet. 4:19).17  
 The Orthodox theologian Alexander Schmemann wrote that "the ecclesiastic life 
in the East is built according to a monastic blueprint, inside monasticism or according to 
the image of monasticism as the only proper way of Christian life.18 Eastern monasticism 
                                                 
 13 Ibid. 268. 
 14Bryanchaninov Ignatiy. “Asketicheskiye opiti” [Ascetics].  Sochineniya, vol. II.( Moscow: 
Moscow Patriarchate, 1989): 101. 
 15Ibid., 103. 
 16 Ibid., 104. 
 17Ibid., 106. 
 18Cf. Schmemann A. Dogmaticheskiy soyuz [The Dogmatic Union].Vstupitel'naya lekciya v kurse 
istorii Vizantiyskoy Cerkvi, prochitannaya 11 oktyabrya 1945 g. [Introductory Lecture to the History of 
dominates both in Orthodox theology and orthopraxis, which is the core of orthodox 
religiosity. The systematic Pastoral Theology (1988), already quoted, declares, that the 
"anthropology of desert, monastic cell and mystical bliss" is the core of the real 
ecclesiastic mind and theological reflection.19
 The Orthodox pastoral theology prescribes, that said principles of submissiveness 
to God's will must be implemented through the practice of the father-child relations 
between the confessor and the penitent. The "Handbook for the Priests" recommends:  
"There are several principles in the relations between a confessor - a  starets, (or a priest) 
and a penitent. The member of a Christian congregation never takes a serious step in his 
life without approval or, at least, without informing his confessor.20  The priest is the 
image of Christ, His icon, Christ's care, Christ's love, he can become Christ's flesh, which 
may be crucified, he is Christ's blood, which may be shed for many".21
 These peculiarities are not marginal elements of a greater, and perhaps more 
liberal Russian Orthodox tradition. Deacon Andrey Kurayev, previous speech writer of 
Patriarch Alexey II stresses in his book Tradition, Dogma, Rite: Apologetic Essays. 
(Moscow-Klin: Izdatel'stwo Bratstwa Swyatitelya Tikhona, 1995): 
Would Roman Catholics be saved? It is doubtful that they will be saved as 
Catholics. In case they consider themselves "simply Christians", then it 
may, probably, happen. /.../ They may be saved due to those elements, 
which have survived in Western Christianity from the Orthodox legacy. It 
means that a Western Christian may be saved in spite of his or her 
"Roman Catholicism."22  
 
 The relations between the confessor -  starets, or priest and penitent is the central 
nerve of Russian culture. They are known in Europe mainly through the literary works by 
Dostoyevski, but the consequences in public life are much more serious. All this does not 
                                                                                                                                                 
Byzantine Church History, red at 11th of October, 1945] (No data of edition). 
 19[Handbook for the Priests], vol. 8: 195. 
 20Ibid.: 195; Vedernikov A.  “Velikiy uchitel' khristianskoy nravstvennosty”. [The Great Teacher 
of Christian Ethics]. Journal of Moscow Patriarchate, No. 12, 1988: 63. 
 21[Handbook for the Priests], vol. 8, 409-410. 
 22Kurayev A.  Tradiciya, dogmat, obryad. Apologeticheskye ocherki [Tradition, Dogma, Rite: 
Apologetic essays]. (Moscow-Klin: Izdatel'stwo Bratstwa Swyatitelya Tikhona,1995): 209. 
mean that the Church has no business meddling with matters of politics and economics; 
that its business is with the eternal salvation of the human soul; and that if it undertakes 
to give ethical advice at all, it should be confined to advice about one's personal conduct. 
But monastic relations in the congregation feed the minds of individuals and deeply 
infect their public conduct. Monastic stereotypes, during its thousand years long history 
have deeply influenced the pattern of public relations. Russian society is passive, 
submissive to public authorities, it has no traditions of organising itself and solving 
problems. 
 The Marxist putsch of 1917 overthrew the pyramid of the Christian Empire but 
did not destroy it. All structures of the society have been left standing unmoved, but they 
have been filled with Marxist ideology which was met by the Russian people as a new 
religion. Nevertheless orthopraxis remained the same. In matters of freedom the place of 
starets and priest was usurped by a Bolshevik commissar, who periodically demanded 
not only complete submission by the party members, but also their almost religious 
confession of their political and moral conduct. The most surprising fact is, that the 
Christian renaissance in Russia means a very active return to the old practice of 
surrendering one's freedom to a starets. This process began in the last decade of the pre-
Gorbachov era mainly among young intellectuals of Moscow and Leningrad. It is going 
on now on a larger scale. The political ideal of the Orthodox people is monarchy, but it is 
ready to support any authoritarian rule.23
 The dramatic return to Christianity in Russia is connected now with the 
restoration of the lost Christian heritage. It is quite obvious, that changing realities of this 
visible and tangible world will pose a question: what should be the Christian's attitude 
toward Russian moral and economic catastrophes? Religious wars of the 17th century 
marked the final destruction of Christendom's synthesis of Church and society in the 
West. Since the 18th century, Europe has turned away from a Christian vision of man and 
his world, and has accepted a radically different vision of its public life, and relegated the 
                                                 
 23The monistic Orthodox conception of Christian freedom gives way to a specific imperialistic 
feeling among the Russians. The ideas of self-determination of the nations are foreign to the Orthodox 
mentality. All must be one in Christ; national or personal freedom is possible on the way to ascetic 
submissiveness to the authorities, or to the imperialistic nations, chosen for the peoples by God for their 
own sake. Empire is Cosmos, national independence is Chaos. 
Christian vision to the status of a permitted option for the private sector. That is not 
typical of the Russian society, which is still living in the 19th century world, in the world 
of old Russian ideals of the Christian state. This world view can explain the extraordinary 
popularity of autocratic V. Putin in Russian society and his would-be undemocratic 
reforms, and the canonisation of the last Russian tzar. 
 
The Analysis, using "Westerners" methodology 
 In April 1997 the private Russian "Institute of Sociological Analysis" conducted 
an  opinion survey on public attitudes toward basic religious and life values.24  The poll 
covered the whole country, including 1593 persons living in all regions of Russia. The 
questionnaire included groups of statements concerning existential and religious attitudes 
of the respondents.  
 The "existential" part of the questionnaire was based mainly on Max Weber's 
sociological approach, represented in his well-known Die protestantische Ethik und der 
Geist des Kapitalismus, adapted to Russian and Orthodox milieu. It was considered, that 
(1) "Protestant ethics" is the agent of modern liberal and individualistic society; (2) 
Orthodox values (which are similar to Weber's "Catholic" values) are leading the society 
back to communist, or feudal community. Both "Protestant" and "Orthodox" approaches 
does not mean dogmatic systems, but popular orientation towards the one or the other 
system of values. The third (3) position is secular, or even cynical, which can be 
expressed in a maxim: "Things which benefit me here and now, are good". 
 The thesis of the research was as follows. The dominance of "Protestant" values 
indicate the modernisation of the Russian society; the "Orthodox" value system is able to 
contribute to much political stability, but will result in stagnation of economy and loss of 
democracy; the “cynical” approach to existential values will lead to great dynamism of 
the society without political stability and clear prospects in future economic prosperity.  
 This opinion survey revealed a deep gap between the three value orientations 
mentioned. Let us consider one of the positions, already discussed in the previous section  
                                                 
 24Zubov A. B. Granitsy razlomov i urovni yedinstva v segodnyashnyei Rossii: uroki 
sociologicheskogo issledovaniya. [Borders of Destruction, and Level of Unity in Contemporary Russia: 
Results of the Sociological Research] "POLITEIA", Moscow, No.  2 (8), 1998, pp. 41-101. 
-  freedom and responsibility of a person. 60,8% of respondents selected the "Protestant" 
statement "Freedom is God's given privilege, everybody can use it as he/she likes, but 
one should always remember, that everybody is responsible to the people and one's own 
conscience”. 31,9% selected the "secular" statement: "Freedom belongs to the person by 
right of birth, one may use it as he/she likes and be responsible exclusively to oneself." 
Only 7% selected the "Orthodox" statement: "Freedom is God's grace, but it is a heavy 
yoke and it is better to surrender it to a person with authority".25  
 Individual freedom is closely connected with attitudes towards political authority. 
To complete this analysis, the same questionnaire asked the respondents to estimate their 
understanding of the state authority. 60,1% of the respondents chose the "Protestant" 
statement: "Authority is needed to maintain order in the state, but it should not dominate 
over the society. Society must control the state authorities". Only 16.8% of the 
respondents aagreed with the opposite "Orthodox" statement: "Authorities are needed to 
provide order in the society and for this reason they should not depend on the society". 
The "Cynical" statement: "The authorities use the power for their own sake and 
statements about the control of society over the state authorities are null and void" gained 
22,8% of respondents’ sympathies.26  
 A much discussed question is the relation of the Russian religious mind towards 
civil law. Ancient societies considered law a sacral norm which should be observed with 
religious zeal. Hobbes’ idea that the lawgiver himself is free from the civil law does not 
agree with the oldest religious conceptions of the God-given-Law. During Soviet tyranny 
the Law was changed into an ornament or worse - into chains for slavery. Soviet legal 
nihilism did not emerge spontaneously. Before the Bolshevik Revolution the peasant 
society of Russia, living under the yoke of serfdom, used to praise "the law of 
conscience" instead of formal Law. The remnants of both types of law-understanding are 
still alive in this society.  
 The questionnaire asked respondents to choose one of three possible statements. 
                                                 
 25Zubov A. B. Granitsy razlomov i urovni yedinstva v segodnyashnyei Rossii: uroki 
sociologicheskogo issledovaniya. [Borders of Destruction, and Level of Unity in Contemporary Russia: 
Results of the Sociological Research] "POLITEIA", Moscow, No.  2 (8) 1998: 76. 
 26Ibid.: 84. 
"Protestant": "Existing laws are not perfect, but they must be served, otherwise society 
will go to chaos; "Orthodox": "Existing laws are not perfect, for this reason it is better to 
live according to conscience instead of obeying laws;" "Cynical": " Existing laws are not 
perfect, they can be ignored. The interests of a man are prior to law and there is no place 
for feeling guilty in case of breaking law". 50.9% chose the "Protestant" statement; 
38.9% accepted the "Orthodox" attitude to the Law, while only 10% supported the 
"cynical" attitude. 
 The sociological research revealed that (1) Russian society is at least willing to be 
moral; (2) they feel a certain "moral imperative" in their souls, but they don't want a 
"person with authority", to decide for them what is good and what is bad. (3) Most 
Russians are aware that public authorities must be controlled by the society. (4) The 
greatest part of the society are Law-obedient. (p.90) We may conclude then, that Russian 
society is ready for democracy and the traditional "Orthodox" orientation in existential 
questions is not valid any more. 
 "Protestant", "Orthodox" and "cynical" attitudes do not correlate with 
corresponding religious affiliation. 55% of the respondents declared themselves as 
"believers" (48% said that they are Orthodox, 1.4% called themselves Protestants, 6% 
said they are Muslims), 37% of the respondents confessed themselves atheists, 8% could 
not answer. Among those, who identified themselves as "believers", only 11% were 
regular church-attenders. 42.2% answered that they never participate in religious 
services. One third of the respondents believed in an afterlife, but 45.6% did not. Even 
13.3% of regular church-attenders did not believe in an afterlife. 
 Nevertheless, approximately one third of the Russians are using religious criteria 
in their philosophy of life, but these people do not form a specific religious confessional 
subculture (Orthodox, Protestant, etc.), or a religious segment of society apart from the 
secular one, as it was in 19th century France. The religious values are cross-confessional 
and even transcending the borders of one religion. They are accepted even by people, 
who declare themselves "atheist". "Protestant" values are accepted by the majority of 
Orthodox church-attenders, as well as atheists. About 20% of Orthodox believers choose 
"secular" statements. 
 How does it happen, that after 70 years of totalitarian Marxist ideology Protestant 
values are so popular? To answer this question the Theological Faculty of the University 
of Latvia conducted a parallel sociological poll, using the same questionnaire as in 
Russia. According to its longer religious tradition27  Latvia is a Protestant country and for 
this reason the results were expected to contrast with those in Russia. 758 persons were 
interviewed in all regions of Latvia. The central thesis in this research was that 50 years 
of Russian soviet occupation could not destroy the Protestant ethic of labor, cultivated 
during 400 years of Protestantism in Latvia. Respondents had to choose one of three 
statements. The "Protestant" one: "Work is a moral necessity; industriousness will give 
you success and prosperity". The "Orthodox-Catholic" position: "Work is a hard 
necessity of life. Extra work is evidence of greed." Secular position: "Work is a way of 
getting money; the best job is that which gives much money with minimal work". 
"Protestant" statement was selected by 76% of Letts and 67% of Russians, living in 
Latvia. The corresponding figure in Russia was only 53,1%. Contrary to what was 
expected in Russia only 15% of Russians supported the "Orthodox" statement. As to 
Letts, only 5% of those interviewed selected "Orthodox-Catholic" statement. But of 
Russians living in Latvia, 10% confirmed their sympathies with this attitude to labor. The 
main alternative to Protestant value orientation in Latvia as well as in Russia is the 
secular orientation which was selected by 31.7% of Russian residents and 17.1% of 
                                                 
 27According to recent data 45% Latvians identify themselves as Lutherans (Katou bazncas 
vstnesis [The Catholic Church Report], No. 17 [157], 4. Aug. 2000., p.7.) In Weber's eyes, Lutheranism 
seem to operate in the opposite way to Calvinism, accepted by Weber as the model of "Protestant ethics". 
The most important theoretical conviction in Lutheranism is the idea of salvation sola fide, and thereby the 
idea that one's actions have no impact on salvation. The central system of values in Lutheranism contains 
an idea that everything should better be left as it is, and since the salvation is given by God's grace and the 
idea of predestination has not had the same central position as in Calvinism, the basic mood of Lutheranism 
seems to be pessimism. In Weber's view, the Lutherans, ideal-typically, have no incentives for rationale 
action, since the stress on a personal relation to Christ tends to orient them towards contemplation. Taken 
together, the construction of the Lutheran view of life does not give any strong motives for action, but 
rather impels the individual to passivity and quietism. (Ekstrand Th. Max Weber in a Theological 
Perspective. Uppsala: Department of Theology, 1999, p.79). 
 Concerning Latvia Weber's strongly dogmatic position doesn't work. It should be remembered, 
that for Weber, religions historically have had two main functions, namely to provide value orientation and 
an overall interpretation of reality. It goes without saying, that the value orientation of German, or Latvian 
Lutherans is closer to the Calvinist model, than to Russian Orthodox. Compared to neighboring Russia the 
value system differs greatly and the ethnic Latvian population before World War II in this respect was 
closer to Germans, than Russians. In 1721, when Russian tzar Peter the Great integrated Latvia into 
Russian Empire, Latvia became the "locomotive" for modernisation of Russia. German Lutheran elite of 
Latvia took key positions in the Ministries in St. Petersburg, but Latvian "blue collars" became the bulk of 
skilled manufacture workers in the capital of Russian Empire. 
inhabitants of Latvia. 
 Max Weber argued that refusal to get rich by legal means is contrary to the 
principles of Protestant ethics as he understood them. Russian theologian A. Zubov, one 
of the co-authors of the sociological research, that was conducted in Russia (Zubov, 
1998, 65),28  stated that the traditional Orthodox position towards riches is expressed in 
Ecclesiastes 9:11: "I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor 
the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of 
understanding, nor yet favor to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all". 
"Russian society always looked with suspicion on riches acquired in a short span of time 
except as a legacy or thanks to "royal service". Riches, obtained in business were 
considered polluted by murder, fraud, and avarice. Poverty, in opposite, was glorified as 
"the fate of Christ", and, by the way, the tremendous scale of robbery during the coup 
d'êtat in 1917, can be explained by the early 20th century Russian society's hatred 
towards the nouveau riche. (The Roman Catholic mind is not so hostile to riches, but, 
according to M. Weber, Catholics, contrary to Protestants who are fond of good food, 
which is available when you have money, prefer good sleep, which would be impossible, 
in case you have a lot of business troubles.) 
 Statements in the questionnaire were formulated as follows: "Protestant": "Wealth 
is better than poverty, but in any case one must live unpretentiously, and with dignity; 
"Orthodox-Catholic": "There is no use trying to get rich, because it is impossible to do so 
by honest means. The life of a poor person is honest contrary to that of a rich person"; 
"Cynical", or "secular": "Wealth in any case is better than poverty. One should do 
everything to get money, and avoid poverty”. The "Protestant" statement was chosen by 
46% of Russians and 67% of Latvians, without considerable difference between the 
ethnic and confessional communities. 
 We have already discussed the attitude of the contemporary Russians towards 
freedom of the individual, which is a very crucial element in the modernisation of 
society. Compared to the 60.8% Russian respondents who chose the "Protestant" 
position, in Latvia the result was 73.9% of the respondents with no difference between 
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the representatives of different ethnic communities and their religious affiliation. The 
"Orthodox-Catholic" position was accepted by 7% of Russians and by 4% of Latvians. 
The "Secular" position was maintained by 31.9% of Russians, and by 21.2% of Latvians. 
 Unfortunately Latvians expressed their Protestant identity only in these three 
positions: attitude towards work, wealth, and freedom of an individual. The rest of the 
statements, concerning philosophical and theological viewpoints of the respondents 
revealed that Russians are more "Protestant" than traditionally Protestant Latvians. 
 These results were contrary to the prognosis. Looking back to the history of 
Stalin's Russia, a Church historian would probably find slight parallels with John Calvin's 
theocratic regime in Geneva (1541-1564). How did this Protestant current appear in 
traditional Orthodox Russia? 
 It should be remembered, that the intellectual circles of Russia were greatly 
interested in Protestant ideas. A hundred years after John Calvin had ruled Geneva, there 
was an anti-Protestant polemic in Russia by a pastor Matthew Filhober in connection 
with the prospects of marriage between Russian princess Irina and a Danish prince. Even 
later, in the 17th century the influence of the European Reformation was still growing in 
Russia (Bulgakoff Makariy, 1996, 19). It is quite probable, that the discussion resulted in 
reforms by Peter the Great, leading to westernization of 18th century Russia. Then the 
neighbouring Livonia (now Latvia and Estonia) with its Protestant population and 
European technical and administrative skills was incorporated into Russian Empire to 
serve as a leading force in the modernisation of Russia. 
 Concerning theological discussion, Georges Florovsky revealed in his research 
Ways of Russian Theology, (1937),29 that this aspect of academic activity was 
systematically suppressed in Russian seminaries. (Universities in Russia never have had 
Theological faculties). The suppressed interest in Protestantism found its way in 
philosophical literature and fiction of the 19th and early 20th centuries.30  The social 
dimension of the suppressed will to inner reform expressed itself when the Revolution of 
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1917 happened. Destroying everything reminding one of the  Orthodox Church, the 
Revolution was trying to create a kind of "Marxist Protestantism" which included several 
elements of Weberian Protestant ethics concerning work, wealth, etc. For this reason  
Protestant Church preaching concerning everyday ethics was not prevented by Soviet 
authorities in Latvia, because it did not differ from the norms, as promoted by soviet 
schools and official propaganda. In other words - Russian Communism in 70 years 
created a Protestant value system in Russia. 
 Obviously the two value orientation systems, the traditional Orthodox one, 
looking for restoration of authoritarian structures and represented by the political elite on 
one hand, and the Protestant viewpoint with its modernisation expectations of the society 
- on the other hand are in mutual balance now. This could be an answer to the crucial 
question “Whether Russia can develop a civil society?”  
 
